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Factors affecting the adoption of crop insurance, forward contracting, and spreading sales are
analyzed using multivariate and multinomial probit approaches that account for simultaneous
adoption and/or correlation among the three risk management adoption decisions. Our em-
pirical results suggest that the decision to adopt crop insurance, forward contracting, and/or
spreading sales are correlated. Richer insights can be drawn from our multivariate and
multinomial probit analysis than from separate, single-equation probit estimation that as-
sumes independence of adoption decisions. Some factors significantly affecting the adoption
of the risk management tools analyzed are proportion of owned acres, off-farm income,
education, age, and level of business risks.
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A key characteristic of agriculture is the high
level of production, market, and financial risks
confronted by producers. The presence of these
risks has given impetus to the development of a
number of agricultural risk management tools
and strategies. To reduce production or yield
risk, for example, a producer has the option of
using several risk reducing instruments or strat-
egies such as yield-based crop insurance and
enterprise diversification. Producers can also
use futures hedging, forward contracting, and
spreading sales to manage market or price risks.
Among the most fundamental and complex
decisions that an agricultural producer has to
make is the choice of a combination or port-
folio of risk management instruments to pro-
vide the best income safety net for his or her
particular situation (Ke and Wang; Coble,
Heifner, and Zuniga). It is not uncommon for a
producer to utilize several risk management
tools, rather than just a single tool, to manage
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adoption of agricultural risk management tools
usually do not analyze this issue inthiscontext.
That is, most previous studies only analyze fac-
tors influencing the adoption of a single risk
managementtool(i.e.,cropinsuranceorhedging),
rather than analyzing these factors while rec-
ognizing the possibility of simultaneous adop-
tion and the potential correlation of adoption
decisions. Examples of studies that analyze
adoption of a single risk management tool are:
Shapiro and Brorsen and Makus et al. for
hedging with futures and options; Goodwin and
Schroeder and Davis et al. for forward con-
tracting/pricing; and Calvin, Sherrick et al.,
and Makki and Somwaru for crop insurance.
One exception is the study of Mishra and El-
Osta, which analyzed the factors that determine
the adoption of both hedging strategies and crop
insurance. Knight et al. is another exception that
examined the determinants of adopting crop
insuranceandforwardcontracting.However,the
estimation procedures and analysis in these
studies implicitly assume that the adoption de-
cisions for the two risk management options
considered are independent of each other, even
though they conduct the analysis with the
knowledge that these two risk management in-
struments can be utilized at the same time. In
these two studies, two discrete choice models
(e.g., logit models) were estimated separately to
model the factors influencing hedging/forward
contracting and crop insurance adoption deci-
sions. By construction, this procedure ignores
the potential relationship between the adoption
decisions of the two risk management instru-
ments. Ignoring the possibility of simultaneous
utilization of these instruments and the potential
relationship between the two adoption decisions
may cause invalid inferences and incorrect
conclusions to be made (Kiefer).
The objective of this study is to examine the
factors that influence producers’ risk manage-
ment adoption decisions while taking into ac-
count the possibility of simultaneous utilization
of multiple risk reducing instruments and the
potential correlations among these adoption
decisions. In particular, we examine factors in-
fluencingfarmers’ use of thefollowing risk man-
agement instruments: crop insurance, forward
contracting, and spreading sales. Data from
farmers in the states of Illinois, Indiana, and
Iowa are used to support multivariate probit and
multinomial probit models, to achieve the study
objectives. The study results provide a better
understanding of which farmer/farm character-
istics influence the use of different risk man-
agement strategies. This information should be
valuable to policy makers, government agencies
(i.e., the Risk Management Agency, RMA),
crop insurance companies, and extension
agents/educators. For example, an awareness of
which type of producer is more likely to adopt
crop insurance would help insurance companies
to better identify potential clientele. This infor-
mation should also help extension educators
target producers that need crop insurance or risk
management education the most.
The remainder of this article proceeds as
follows. Thetheoretical frameworkispresented
in the next section. The estimation procedure,
data used, and the empirical specification are
then described. This is followed by a presen-
tation and discussion of the empirical results.
Conclusions are presented in the final section.
Conceptual Framework
In this article, we model the farmer’s choice of
agricultural risk management tools in an ex-
pected utility framework (Ke and Wang; Coble,
Heifner, and Zuniga; Sherrick et al.). This
framework assumes that different farmers assess
their end-of-period expected utilities for their
own specific risk environments (i.e., production
and marketing risks) and risk preferences. This
approach further assumes that the presence of
riskmanagementtoolsfundamentally affectsthe
net return distribution of each producer. The
farmer then examines his or her net return dis-
tribution by considering the certainty equivalent
for each risk management tool and calculating
its associated reservation cost. The reservation
cost is the amount that would make the farmer
indifferent to the use of an agricultural risk
management tool (i.e., for crop insurance, it is
the reservation premium). The farmer then
compares the reservation cost with the actual
cost of adoption and adopts an agricultural risk
management tool if the reservation cost is larger
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a larger certainty equivalent net return with the
risk management tool relative towithout the risk
management tool.
More formally, consider a producer making
the decision of whether or not to adopt any,
some, or all of the agricultural risk manage-
ment tools, j, available to him or her (j 5
1,..., m). This producer evaluates each of
these m risk management tools by considering
its effect on the returns distribution to a set of
assets, A, used in production. These assets have
a stochastic rate of return ~ rA, with mean   rA, and
variance s2
A, reflecting overall business risks.
Financial risk is introduced through the use of
debt capital. Utilizing the accounting identity
that assets are equal to debt plus equity (A 5
D1E)andassumingafixedcostofdebt,cD,th e
expected rate of return to equity (  rE) and the
variance of the return to equity (s2
E) can, re-
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Given the stochastic environment above, the
producer’s certainty equivalent end-of-period
wealth can be approximated as follows (under
known sufficient conditions):
(3) WCE 5W   rs2
W,
where WCE is the farmer’s certainty equivalent
of end-of-period wealth (W), W is the mean of
W, s2
W is the variance of W, and r is the pa-
rameter reflective of risk preferences. Note that
maximizing WCE is equivalent to maximizing
the certainty equivalent rate of return on equity
(rCE), which can be defined as:
(4) rCE 5rE   rs2
E.
From Equations (1) and (2), the expression in
Equation (4) can be rewritten as:
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The effects of using agricultural risk manage-
ment tools are then assumed to be embodied in
the changes in the mean and variance of the
asset return distribution, and in the costs (C)o f
using these types of tools for managing risks
(i.e., the cost for crop insurance use is the
premium paid). Given this cost, the effect of
using a particular agricultural risk management
tool is to reduce the rate of return to equity by
C= E. Taking this reduction into account, for
every risk management tool j available to the
producer, the certainty equivalent rate of return
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In theory, the highest cost that a producer is
willing to incur for the use of an agricultural
risk management tool (i.e., the reservation cost
C 
j) is the amount that implicitly equates the
expected utilities from using and not using the
risk management tool. Hence, by Equations (5)













































Solving for C 
j, we then get the following
expression:
(8) C 





A,j   s2
AÞ.
Using Equation (8), the producer will then de-
cide to use a particular risk management tool if
the difference between the reservation cost and
the actual cost of using j is greater than zero
ð ^ CD >0Þ; where ^ CD 5ðC 
j   CActual
j Þ. Note that
the difference ^ CD is an unobserved latent var-
iable, but the adoption decision (Yj) is observ-
able such that:
(9) Yj 5
1 if ^ CD >0





where Yj5 1 if the producer adopts the risk
management tool j and Yj5 0, otherwise.
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empirically tractable to estimate the factors
influencing the simultaneous utilization of risk
management tools. In this regard, the expres-
sion in Equation (8) suggests that variables
related to asset size (A), risk attitudes (r), le-
verage (A/E), as well as variables that deter-
mine how the risk management tool affects the
mean and variance of the return to assets
ðð  rA,j     rA) and ðs2
A,j   s2
AÞÞ, all help deter-
mine the producer’s reservation cost for j.
Consequently, these factors directly affect the
value of the unobserved latent variable ^ CD and
the decision of whether or not to utilize a par-
ticular risk management tool.
From a different perspective, the framework
above also suggests that the farmer’s decision to
adopta particular risk management tool depends
on: (1) factors affecting the return distribution
even without the use of risk management tools
(i.e., asset size, leverage, and risk attitudes), and
(2) the factors that determine the degree to
which the return distribution is altered with the
use of risk management tool j. Moreover, the
framework above allows for simultaneous utili-
zation of several risk management tools through
its effect on ð  rA,j     rAÞ and ðs2
A,j   s2
AÞ.T h a ti s ,
the effect of a particular risk management tool,
say j 5 1,onthe mean andvariance ofthe return
distribution depends on whether or not the pro-
ducer uses other available risk management
toolsj52,...,n;andviceversa.Thisimplicitly
assumes that the decision to adopt one risk
management tool is correlated with whether or
not other risk management tools will be used.
Hence, it may be important to take this into
account when conducting an empirical analysis
of factors affecting the adoption of several risk
management tools.
Empirical Approach and Data
Estimation Procedures: Multivariate
Probit Model
The conceptual framework above can be em-
pirically implemented using a multivariate
probit estimation procedure. This approach al-
lows for the possible contemporaneous corre-
lation in the decisions to adopt the three risk
management tools we are considering: crop
insurance, forward contracting, and spreading
sales.1 In line with Equations (8) and (9) above,
a general multivariate probit model can be
specified as follows:
(10) Yij 5x9 ijbj 1eij,
where Yij (j 5 1,.., m) represent the risk man-
agement alternatives (in our case m 5 3) faced
by the ith producer (i 5 1,..,n),2 x 0
ij is a 1   k
vector of observed variables that affect the risk
management adoption decision (i.e., as dis-
cussed above, the observed variables related to
A, r, etc.), bj is a k   1 vector of unknown
parameters (to be estimated), and eij is the un-
observed error term.
The model specified in Equation (10) can be
empirically implemented using a series of in-
dependent probit or logit models for each risk
management alternative j.H o w e v e r ,a sw e
noted above, it is possible to adopt risk man-
agement tools simultaneously and thus it is
likely that these decisions are correlated. In this
case, the unobserved error terms for the probit
or logit models would not be independent. Ig-
noring this correlation in analyzing the simul-
taneous adoption of risk management tools
1Note that multivariate probit estimation has al-
ready been used in a number of studies that evaluate
factors that affect adoption of agricultural technologies
(see Gillespie, Davis, and Rahelizatovo; Fernandez-
Cornejo, Hendricks, and Mishra). For example, Gilles-
pie, Davis, and Rahelizatovo use this approach to
estimate factors that affect adoption of four breeding
technologies in hog production. They argue that mod-
eling adoption decisions using a multivariate probit
framework ‘‘allows for increased efficiency in estima-
tion in the case of simultaneity of adoption.’’ However,
they admit the limitation of a multivariate probit
procedure, relative to a multinomial probit model, that
‘‘Such a model does not allow for the computation of
the probability of adoption of more than one technol-
ogy at a time...’’. At the same time, Gillespie, Davis,
and Rahelizatovo eventually defend the use of a mul-
tivariate probit in their estimation since it ‘‘does
account for contemporaneous correlation and reduce
bias’’ and using the multinomial probit for analyzing
three or more alternatives is computationally difficult
(See Gillespie, Davis, and Rahelizatovo, pp. 38 and
39).
2In this specification, each Yj is a binary variable
and, thus, Equation (10) is actually a system of m
equations (m 5 3 in this case).
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probabilities and incorrect estimates of the
standard errors of the parameters (Kiefer).
Hence, in the multivariate probit approach to
estimate the unknown parameters in Equation
(10), the error terms (across j 5 1,.., m alter-
natives) are assumed to have multivariate nor-
mal distributions with mean vector equal to
zero and a covariance matrix R with diagonal
elements equal to one.
With the assumption of multivariate nor-
mality, the unknown parameters in Equation
(10) can be estimated using maximum likeli-
hood (ML) procedures. The probabilities that
enter the likelihood function (as well as the
derivatives needed for the ML procedure) are
computed using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane (GHK) simulation procedure (see
Geweke; Hajivassiliou; Keane), which pro-









where r   ðÞis the m-variate normal density of x
with mean vector equal to zero and m   m
positive definite covariance matrix W. The log-
likelihood for the model is then calculated as
the sum of the logs of the probabilities of the




where z is a vector defined from zm 5b9 mxm, R
is the correlation matrix, and T is a diagonal
matrix with tmm 52ym   1, and MVN refers to
the density being multivariate normal (see
Greene 2007). In this study, pairwise correla-
tion of the error terms associated with each risk
management adoption decision is computed
and its significance is tested.
Note that there are a number of different
marginal effects that can be computed given the
multivariate nature of the model (see Greene
2003).Theapproach taken here is tofirst obtain
the expected value of a positive adoption de-
cision for a particular risk management tool
(say, Y1 5 1), conditional on all other risk
management tools also being adopted
(Y2,...,Ym5 1):
(13)








Then, to get the marginal effects, the derivative
of Equation (13) is taken with respect to the






















where x is the union of all the regressors that
appear in the model and gm is defined such that
zm 5x9gm 5b9 mxm. Hence, the marginal effect
in Equation (14) shows how an explanatory
variable affects the probability of adopting the
first risk management tool, conditional on the
other tools being adopted. Standard errors for
these marginal effects are obtained using the
delta method and a bootstrapping procedure
(see Greene 2007 for more details).
Estimation Procedures: Multinomial
Probit Model
An alternative estimation approach to the
multivariate probit model presented above is
the multinomial probit procedure.3 In a multi-
nomial (rather than multivariate) probit model,
3The multinomial probit has been recognized as an
alternative to multivariate probit (and vice versa) in a
number of previous agricultural economics studies. In
the technology adoption literature (as discussed in
footnote 1), Gillespie, Davis, and Rahelizatovo recog-
nize that both approaches are equally valid and dis-
cussed the advantages/disadvantages of each. But they
eventually decided to use the multivariate probit ap-
proach for their analysis (see Anton; Nhemachena and
Hassan for studies that used similar arguments to
defend the use of a multivariate probit approach). On
the other hand, Seo and Mendelsohn (p. 7) suggests
that both approaches to analyzing adoption decisions
are ‘‘theoretically sound’’ and that it really depends on
the particular context of the study on which one to use.
Hence, there are studies that have used both
approaches since each approach provides slightly dif-
ferent inferences that can be useful for further under-
standing the adoption decisions of interest (see
Roucan-Kane and Keeney; Seo and Mendelsohn). In
this study, we opted to use the two approaches pre-
cisely because of this reason.
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binations of risk management tools instead of
just the risk management alternatives by
themselves. With three risk management al-
ternatives in this study, we have eight possible
combinations (2
3) that a producer can choose to
adopt: (1) use no risk management tool con-
sidered in this study (i.e., the producer did not
adopt any of the following: crop insurance,
forward contracts, and spreading sales), (2) use
crop insurance only, (3) use forward contract-
ing only, (4) use spreading sales only, (5) use
crop insurance and forward contracting, (6) use
crop insurance and spreading sales, (7) use
forward contracting and spreading sales, and
(8) use all three risk management tools simul-
taneously. Given this choice set, a multinomial
probit model can be specified as follows:
(15) Yi 5x9 ib1ei, ei ’ MVNð0,SÞ,
where Yi in this case represent the risk man-
agement tool combination (Yi 5 1, .., m) that
the ith producer (i 5 1,.., n) chooses,4 x9i is a
1   k vector of observed variables that affect
the risk management combination chosen, b is
a k   1 vector of unknown parameters (to be
estimated), and ei is the unobserved error term.
The unobserved error term in this case is as-
sumed to be multivariate normal with mean
zero and variance-covariance matrix S.5 A
maximum likelihood (ML) procedure is used to
estimate the unknown parameters in Equation
(15).
Using the multinomial probit estimation
procedure allows one to calculate the marginal
effects ofthe explanatory variables with respect
to the probability of adopting one of the risk
management combinations discussed above.
For example, one can calculate the marginal
effect of a particular explanatory variable on
the probability of adopting all three risk man-
agement tools (i.e., how does farm size, for
example, affect the probability of adopting
combination 8?). Note that this is different
from the marginal effect calculated using the
multivariate probit approach (see Equations
(13) and (14)) where one calculates the mar-
ginal effect for one particular risk management
tool, conditional on adoption of the other tools
(i.e., how does farm size, for example, affect
the probability of adopting crop insurance
conditional on the producer also adopting for-
ward contracting and spreading sales?). Hence,
the marginal effects from the multinomial
probit estimation provide additional informa-
tion that can also be helpful to various stake-
holders interested in risk management tool
adoption (i.e., policymakers, crop insurance
companies, RMA, extension educators).6
Data Description
The data used inthis studyare froma 2001mail
survey of corn and soybean farmers in Illinois,
Iowa, and Indiana that was sent prior to the start
of the planting season. This survey was struc-
tured to provide a relatively broad geographic
base, a sizeable farm population, and a cost-
effective data collection approach. Three
thousand farmers, each of whom operates
at least 160 acres, were randomly chosen to
receive the survey from a mailing list main-
tained by Progressive Farmer, a company
that communicates extensively with farmers
4The variable Y is coded from 1,..,m (where m 5 8
in our case), so that Equation (15) is only one equation
to be estimated. In practice, only m – 1choices (instead
of m) are included in the choice set (i.e., one choice
serves as the ‘‘base’’ category) for identification pur-
poses. This restriction is required because in practice
only data on the actual choices are available so that
identification comes from comparisons of utilities and
not from levels of utilities (see Greene 2003). Hence,
interpretations of parameters and marginal effects are
always relative to the ‘‘base’’ category.
5The covariance structure (S) allows the multino-
mial probit to not have the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) assumption, which is the limitation
of another popular discrete multiple choice model—
the multinomial logit.
6One reviewer pointed out that some stakeholders
may be more interested in how explanatory variables
affect the risk management tool combination chosen
by producers, rather than how explanatory variables
affect adoption of one particular risk management
tool, conditional on the other tools being adopted.
Using the multinomial probit approach allows us to
easily calculate how different variables affect the
probability of choosing a certain combination of risk
management tools, which is the primary reason why
we also use this estimation procedure in this study.
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interviews.
Survey development was aided by discus-
sions with two focus groups of farmers, ex-
tensive pretesting, and input from USDA-ERS
and Risk Management Agency (RMA) re-
viewers. Included in the survey were questions
related to demographic and business informa-
tion, risk management, risk attributes and per-
ceptions, and other related information (a copy
of the survey is available from the authors upon
request). A total of 926 surveys were returned
and 871 were considered sufficiently complete
tobe usable (that is an effectiveresponse rate of
29%).
Empirical Specification
As mentioned above, the three risk manage-
ment adoption decisions that serve as the de-
pendent variable for the multivariate probit
estimation procedure are crop insurance, for-
ward contracting, and spreading sales. These
three risk management practices were chosen
because they are the production and/or mar-
keting risk management tools most frequently
adopted by producers in our sample. Moreover,
with these three risk management tools under
consideration, eight possible combinations of
these tools are used as the basis for the de-
pendent variable in the multinomial probit
estimation.
Consistent with the conceptual framework
above, the independent variables (xi) included
in our empirical specification are observable
factors related to asset size (A), risk attitudes
ðrÞ, and/or leverage (A/E). Note that we do not
explicitly observe how the risk management
toolsinteract to affect thenet returndistribution
(mean and variance) of the producer, which
means that this factor would be subsumed in
the error terms of the system of equations in the
multivariate probit model. Importantly, we ac-
count for this unobserved interaction among
the adoption decisions by allowing for simul-
taneous adoption and correlation of the error
terms in the multivariate probit approach.
The factors related to asset size included in
the empirical specification are proportion of
total acres owned and total farm size. A larger
proportion of owned acres is related to greater
wealth, greater stability of land control, and a
larger asset base. Consequently, a higher pro-
portion of owned aces and/or greater farm size
signals a larger capacity for bearing risk (i.e., it
also affects risk attitudes r) and a lesser need
for risk management instruments. Hence, we
expect that owned acres is negatively related to
risk management tool adoption. Larger farm
size is also suggestive of a larger asset base
from which to draw resources. A larger farm
size necessarily reflects at least some degree of
increased spatial dispersion, perhaps including
multiple farm locations, that tends to reduce
production risk. Larger operations also benefit
from economies of scale and better managerial
capacities that fundamentally affect asset base
and risk attitudes. In light of these character-
istics, the relationship between farm size and
adoption of different risk management tools
appears ambiguous (and depends on the par-
ticular tool).
A farmer’s perception about his or her level
of business risk is one variable that empirically
represents risk attitudes. In particular, farmers’
risk perceptions are measured by their per-
ceived probability of receiving a multiperil or
actual production history (APH) crop insurance
indemnity payment at the 85% coverage level
(for both corn and soybeans). A higher proba-
bility of receiving an APH payment reflects
higher perceived business risks. Producers with
higher business risks may have more incentives
to adopt risk management tools. We also posit
that socioeconomic and demographic factors,
such as age, education, and off-farm income,
signal differences in risk attitudes and are in-
cluded in the empirical specification as well
(Smith and Baquet; Sherrick et al.). Previous
studies have found mixed results in terms of the
effect of age andeducation onrisk management
tool adoption (Mishra and El-Osta). But, in
general, it is typically hypothesized that pro-
ducers with more experience and more educa-
tion tend to adopt more sophisticated risk
management tools. Experience and education
are also perceived to contribute to more precise
risk assessments and reflect differing risk atti-
tudes (Sherrick et al.). Off-farm income, on the
other hand, represents a form of diversification
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of producers. Higher off-farm incomes may
indicate a greater capacity to bear risks (i.e.,
because of stability of income, the possibility
of ‘‘self-insurance’’) and may reduce incentives
to adopt risk management tools.
The financial leverage variable used in the
empirical analysis is the debt-to-asset ratio. In
general, higher debts (reflected by higher debt-
to-asset ratios) are indicative of greater finan-
cial risks. Producers with higher financial risk
are expected to have more incentive to use risk
management instruments and, thus, a positive
relationship between debt-to-asset ratio and
risk management decisions is anticipated. Note
that state dummy variables are also included in
the specification as control variables.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficient
Table 1 provides definitions and descriptive
statistics for the variables included in the em-
pirical specification of the multivariate probit
model. The percentage of producers in the
sample using some form of crop insurance is
46%. Producers who utilize forward contracts
and are spreading sales comprise 38% and 49%
of the sample, respectively. The detailed pro-
portions of producers using different combi-
nations of risk management tools are presented
in Table 2. Note that there is no producer in our
sample that used crop insurance by itself.
Hence, this category is omitted in our multi-
nomial probit analysis below.
Pairwise correlation coefficients across the
three risk management adoption equations are
presented in Table 3. These coefficients mea-
sure the correlation between the risk manage-
ment decisions considered, after the influence
of the observed factors has been accounted for
(Greene 2003). These coefficients are essen-
tially the pairwise correlation between the error
terms in the system of equations in the multi-
variate probit model. All of the correlation
coefficients are positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level. This supports our hy-
pothesis that the error terms in the risk man-
agement adoption equations are correlated, and
a multivariate probit approach would be ap-
propriate in this case. The perceived interaction
between risk management tools (which is un-
observed) and its potential effects on the pro-
ducer’s net return distribution is accounted for
in the multivariate probit approach.
Moreover, the positive signs of the correla-
tion coefficients suggest that the decision to
adopt one particular risk management tool may
make it more likely that another tool is adopted.
For example, a producer who uses crop insur-
ance may also tend to spread sales (once the
observable factors are controlled for), and vice
versa (see Sartwelle et al. for a similar result).
The positive correlation between crop insur-
ance and spreading sales/forward contracting is
consistent with the notion that, in general, these
types of instruments are needed to cover both
production and price risks. As an alternative
explanation, it could be argued that producers
who adopt one kind of risk management in-
strument (say, crop insurance) tend to be highly
risk-averse such that, behaviorally, they are
also more likely to adopt other risk manage-
ment tools (say spreading sales and/or forward
contracting).
Parameter Estimates: Multivariate Probit Model
The parameter estimates from the multivariate
probit and (for comparison) the individual
probit models are presented in Table 4. Based
on the multivariate model, the observed factors
that tend to significantly affect adoption of crop
insurance are the proportion of owned acres,
and off-farm income levels. As expected, pro-
ducers who farm more owned acres do not tend
to use crop insurance. Farmers with off-farm
income greater than $50,000 also do not tend to
use crop insurance. On the other hand, our re-
sults do suggest that producers with low levels
of off-farm income still tend to use crop in-
surance as a risk-reducing instrument. The pos-
itive and significant parameter estimate on the
Iowa state dummy reflects a higher likelihood
of adopting crop insurance in this state relative
to the omitted state (Indiana).
For the forward contracting adoption equa-
tion, the significant variables in the multivari-
ate probit approach are education, total farm
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income levels. As with the crop insurance re-
sults above, producers with higher proportions
of owned acres do not tend to use forward
contracting. On the other hand, producers with
low levels of off-farm income (between 0 and
$5,000) tend to use forward contracting as a
risk-reducing instrument. Our results also sug-
gest that older farmers do not use forward
contracting, which is consistent with the notion
that farmers with more experience tend to not
use risk management instruments such as for-
ward contracting. In contrast, farmers with more
education and larger farms tend to use forward
contracting. This is consistent with the notion
that well-educated producers have the human
capital to more fully comprehend and utilize the
nuances of effectively utilizing risk management
tools, especially the more complex ones (Goodwin
and Schroeder; Smith and Baquet; Mishra and
El-Osta). The positive effect of larger farm size
suggests that there may be economies of size
and increased managerial efficiencies in the
utilization of forward contracting instruments
(Sherrick et al.).
Significant variables in the spreading sales
equation are off-farm income levels, education,
and age. Farmers with off-farm income greater
than $50,000 do not tend to spread sales over
time. Younger producers and producers with
higher levels of education are more likely to
spread sales. The significant parameter esti-
mate on the Iowa state dummy variable sug-
gests that producers in this state are more likely
to spread sales than producers in the omitted
state (Indiana).
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables (n 5 871)
Variable Description Mean St. Dev.
A. Dependent variables:
Crop insurance 5 1 if the producer is using any kind of crop
insurance (yield or revenue insurance),
zero otherwise
0.4592 0.4986
Forward contracting 5 1 if the producer is using forward
contracting, zero otherwise
0.3823 0.4862




Proportion of acres owned Proportion of own acres 0.4805 0.3769
Age Age of respondent as of February 2001 53.8037 12.0879
Off-farm income $0–$5,000 5 1 if farmer has off-farm income between
$0–$5,000/year, zero otherwise
0.0873 0.2824
Off-farm income $5–$50,000 5 1 if farmer has off-farm income between
$5,000–$50,000/year, zero otherwise
0.2870 0.4562
Off-farm income > $50,000 5 1 if farmer has off-farm income > $50,000/year,
zero otherwise
0.0723 0.2592
Education Years of education (no. of years) 13.7910 1.7856
Debt/asset ratio 5 1 if farm has a debt-to-asset ratio > 40%, zero
otherwise
0.1469 0.3543
Farm size Total farm size (acres) 844.758 1395.576
Probability of APH/corn Perceived probability of getting an insurance
payment under APH plan at 85% coverage




Perceived probability of getting an insurance
payment under APH plan at 85% coverage
level for soybeans (%)
23.6383 20.2901
Illinois 5 1 if farm is located in Illinois, zero otherwise 0.3949 0.4891
Iowa 5 1 if farm is located is Iowa, zero otherwise 0.4707 0.4994
Indiana 5 1 if farm is located is Indiana, zero otherwise 0.1332 0.3399
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rameter estimates from the multivariate probit
approach. For comparison, we also report the
parameter estimates from an equation-by-
equation individual probit approach. In general,
the signs and significant variables in both
approaches are fairly similar (except for the
following variables in the spreading sales
equation: Off-Farm Income $0–$5,000 and
Farm Size). However, note that the multivariate
probit approach allows for calculating a ‘‘con-
ditional’’ marginal effect (i.e., marginal effects
conditional on the adoption of the other risk
management tools), while the individual probit
models do not allow for this calculation. The
next section discusses this issue in more detail.
Marginal Effects: Multivariate Probit Model
The marginal effects for both the multivariate
probit and individual probit approaches are
presented in Table 5. The significant variables
in Table 4 also have significant marginal effects
in Table 5. In addition, the marginal effect for
education in the crop insurance equation, the
debt-to-asset ratio, and levels of business risk
(as reflected by the perceived probability of
getting an insurance payment under the APH
plan at 85% coverage level for both corn and
soybeans) in all equations are significant as
well. Producers with higher perceived proba-
bility of getting APH payments on corn
(Probability of APH/Corn) are more likely to
adopt crop insurance and spread sales. On the
other hand, producers with higher levels of
business risk associated with soybeans pro-
duction (higher perceived probability of APH
payments for soybeans, Probability of APH/
Soybeans) tend to use forward contracting.
Furthermore, the negative signs on the Proba-
bility of APH/Corn variable in the forward
contracting equation, and Probability of APH/
Soybeans variable in the spread sales equations,
suggest that producers with higher levels of
business risk in corn do not tend to use forward
contracting, while producers with higher levels
of business risk in soybeans are less likely to
adopt spread sales.
Table 3. Multivariate Probit Model Results: Correlation Coefficients of Risk Management
Adoption Decisions
Risk Management Decisions Correlation Coefficient Standard Deviation
Crop Insurance and Forward Contracting 0.7282*** 0.0332
Crop Insurance and Spreading Sales 0.6892*** 0.0378
Forward Contracting and Spreading Sales 0.7759*** 0.0300
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 2. Proportion of Producers Adopting Different Combinations of Risk Management Tools
Possible Risk Management Tool Combinations
a Number of Farmers Proportion (%)
(1) Use no risk management tool 393 45.12
(2) Use crop insurance only 0 0.00
(3) Use forward contracting only 19 2.18
(4) Use spreading sales only 52 5.97
(5) Use crop insurance and forward contracting 34 3.90
(6) Use crop insurance and spreading sales 93 10.68
(7) Use forward contracting and spreading sales 65 7.46
(8) Use all three risk management tools 215 24.68
Total 871 100.00
a The different combinations of risk management tools above serve as the basis for coding the dependent variable in the
multinomial probit model. The dependent variable is coded such that Yi 5 1, ..., 8 and only one combination (among the eight)
is chosen by the producer. Note that combinatin 2 is dropped in the analysis since no producer used this particular combination.
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in the crop insurance equation is consistent
with the hypothesis of Shapiro and Brorsen that
farmers become less risk-averse as they gain
more education, thus decreasing the likelihood
of using crop insurance as a risk reducing
strategy. In contrast, the education variable is
positive and significant in the forward con-
tracting and spreading sales equations. As we
mentioned above, these mixed results are con-
sistent with the results from the empirical lit-
erature in general. Investigating the reasons for
these mixed results may be a fruitful direction
for future research.
It is important to reiterate here that the
calculated marginal effects for the multivariate
probit approach are conditional on the adoption
of the other risk management instruments [see
Equations (13) and (14) above]. This means
that we are measuring the effects of an ob-
served factor on the probability of adoption of
one risk management tool given that the other
risk management tools are adopted. This is
different from the calculated marginal effects
Table 4. Parameter Estimates from the Multivariate Probit and Individual Probit Approach for
Estimating the Factors Affecting Adoption of Agricultural Risk Management Tools
Parameter Estimates from the
Multivariate Probit Approach
Parameter Estimates from the
Individual Probit Approach

















20.3333** 20.2896** 20.1819 20.3163** 20.2885** 20.1917
(0.1321) (0.1346) (0.1299) (0.1281) (0.1308) (0.1262)
Age 20.0047 20.0156***20.0119*** 0.0049 20.0167*** 20.0117***
(0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0034)
Off-farm income
$0–$5,000
0.4926*** 0.4727*** 0.2607 0.4912*** 0.4904*** 0.2664*
(0.1656) (0.1676) (0.1649) (0.1625) (0.1606) (0.1589)
Off-farm income
$5–$50,000
0.1754* 0.1046 0.0927 0.1764* 0.0989 0.0952
(0.1052) (0.1047) (0.1036) (0.1020) (0.1037) (0.1012)
Off-farm income
> $50,000
20.4629** 20.2518 20.3561* 20.4402** 20.2459 20.3574**
(0.1935) (0.1926) (0.1905) (0.1883) (0.1859) (0.1801)
Education 20.0135 0.0492*** 0.0313** 20.0129 0.0540*** 0.0318**
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0144)
Debt/asset ratio 0.0980 0.1222 0.0225 0.1157 0.1099 0.0339
(0.1280) (0.1293) (0.1293) (0.1267) (0.1276) (0.1259)
Farm size 0.0043 0.0091*** 0.0065 0.0045 0.0083** 0.0056*
(0.0053) (0.0032) (0.0058) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Probability of
APH/corn
0.0085 20.0070 0.0003 0.0083* 20.0049 0.0005
(0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0049)
Probability of
APH/soybeans
0.0004 0.0023 20.0011 0.0004 0.0006 20.0016
(0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0051)
Illinois 0.0434 20.0032 0.1680 0.0427 20.0039 0.1712
(0.1413) (0.1437) (0.1375) (0.1383) (0.1391) (0.1364)
Iowa 0.2784** 20.1083 0.2664** 0.2832** 20.1225 0.2722**
(0.1357) (0.1381) (0.1324) (0.1318) (0.1333) (0.1302)
Log-likelihood
value
21418.7750 2567.5860 2541.3639 583.4922
Akaike I.C. 1.3309 1.2706 1.3674
Schwarz I.C. 1216.4077 1163.9635 1248.2202
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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adoption decision is assumed exogenous to the
other risk management decision.
Ingeneral,we find thatmarginaleffectsfrom
the multivariate probitapproach tendtobelower
than the marginal effects from the individual
probit approach. This suggests that the effect of
an observed factor on the likelihood of adopting
a risk management tool tends to be tempered
when another risk management tool is already
being used. For example, the marginal effect of
the proportion of owned acres on crop insurance
use is 20.13 for the individual probit while it is
20.08 for the multivariate probit. The magni-
tude of the effect of owned acres on crop
insurance adoption is lower when forward con-
tracting and spreading sales are already being
used. Another general observation from Table 5
is that the number of significant variables and
the level of significance using the multivariate
probit approach are higher compared to the
individual probit model approach. Thus, even
though the magnitudes of the effects of the
observable factors are lower in the multivariate
approach, the significance tends to be higher
when the marginal effects are calculated con-
ditional on the adoption of the other risk man-
agement tools. Also, some marginal effects are
insignificant in the individual probit case, but
are significant in the multivariate probit
Table 5. Marginal Effects from the Multivariate Probit Versus Individual Probit Approach to
Estimating the Factors Affecting Adoption of Agricultural Risk Management Tools
Marginal Effects from the
Multivariate Probit Approach
Marginal Effects from the
Individual Probit Approach

















20.0787*** 20.0746*** 0.0096 20.1255** 20.1092** 20.0764
(0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0160) (0.0508) (0.0495) (0.0503)
Age 0.0011 20.0051*** 20.0012** 20.0019 20.0063*** 20.0047***
(0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Off-farm income
$0–$5,000
0.1157*** 0.1301*** 20.0218 0.1931** 0.1923** 0.1057*
(0.0184) (0.0169) (0.0.0247) (0.0613) (0.0633) (0.0621)
Off-farm income
$5–$50,000
0.0464*** 0.0157** 0.0013 0.0701* 0.0377 0.0379
(0.0045) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0406) (0.0397) (0.0403)
Off-farm income
> $50,000
20.1098*** 20.0137 20.0481*** 20.1669* 20.0893 20.1393**
(0.0140) (0.0213) (0.0164) (0.0665) (0.0642) (0.0674)
Education 20.0138*** 0.0208*** 0.0038*** 0.0051 0.0205*** 0.0127**
(0.0026) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057)
Debt/asset ratio 0.0232*** 0.0408*** 20.0154** 0.0460 0.0421 0.0135
(0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0052) (0.0505) (0.0494) (0.0502)
Farm size 20.0001 0.0028*** 0.0004 0.0018 0.0031** 0.0022*
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Probability of
APH/corn
0.0039*** 20.0043*** 0.0006*** 0.0033* 20.0019 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Probability of
APH/soybeans
0.0002 0.0012*** 20.0008*** 0.0002 0.0002 20.0006
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Illinois 20.0007 20.0342*** 0.0521*** 0.0169 20.0015 0.0682
(0.0027) (0.0067) (0.0016) (0.0549) (0.0526) (0.0542)
Iowa 0.0885** 20.1252*** 0.0838*** 0.1121** 20.0463 0.1082**
(0.0019) (0.0179) (0.0030) (0.0519) (0.0502) (0.0515)
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are bootstrapped standard errors. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. Marginal effects are calculated at the means of explanatory variables.
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Combination/Independent Variables
Parameter Estimate Marginal Effect
Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error
Combination 3: Forward contracting only
Proportion of acres owned 20.6545* 0.3607 20.0063 0.1077
Age 20.0065 0.0120 0.0001 0.0010
Off-farm income $0–$5,000 23.7817 91.7813 20.0148* 0.0057
Off-farm income$5–$50,000 20.1013 0.2955 20.0025 0.0425
Off-farm income > $50,000 20.2865 0.4730 0.0001 0.0073
Education 0.0205 0.0772 0.0002 0.0048
Debt/asset ratio 0.2156 0.3756 0.0036 0.0592
Farm size 20.0784** 0.0347 20.0012 0.0202
Probability of APH/corn 20.0319 0.0196 20.0004 0.0083
Probability of APH/soybeans 0.0176 0.0193 0.0003 0.0052
Illinois 20.1389 0.3671 20.0037 0.0633
Iowa 20.3557 0.3642 20.0079 0.1322
Combination 4: Spreading sales only
Proportion of acres owned 20.3381 0.2617 20.0072 0.0226
Age 20.0134 0.0086 20.0002 0.0006
Off-farm income $0–$5,000 20.7104 0.5272 20.0483*** 0.0130
Off-farm income$5–$50,000 20.0588 0.2168 20.0107 0.0165
Off-farm income > $50,000 20.4605 0.3943 20.0146 0.0248
Education 20.0981* 0.0587 20.0094** 0.0047
Debt/asset ratio 20.2764 0.3119 20.0238 0.0182
Farm size 20.0480** 0.0199 20.0040 0.0026
Probability of APH/corn 20.0034 0.0114 20.0001 0.0011
Probability of APH/soybeans 20.0061 0.0117 20.0004 0.0010
Illinois 0.1531 0.3001 0.0050 0.0248
Iowa 0.1812 0.2916 0.0042 0.0249
Combination 5: Crop insurance and forward contracting
Proportion of acres owned 20.8842*** 0.3141 20.0472* 0.0249
Age 20.0070 0.0094 0.0002 0.0006
Off-farm income $0–$5,000 0.4777 0.3391 0.0235 0.0297
Off-farm income$5–$50,000 0.1131 0.2426 0.0039 0.0168
Off-farm income > $50,000 20.6429 0.5340 20.0211 0.0219
Education 20.0469 0.0614 20.0038 0.0040
Debt/asset ratio 0.0289 0.2997 0.0001 0.0203
Farm size 20.0070 0.0159 20.0001 0.0017
Probability of APH/corn 20.0006 0.0124 0.0001 0.0010
Probability of APH/soybeans 20.0055 0.0126 20.0003 0.0009
Illinois 20.0431 0.3100 20.0105 0.0205
Iowa 20.0846 0.3051 20.0162 0.0227
Combination 6: Crop insurance and spreading sales
Proportion of acres owned 20.4048* 0.2303 20.0253 0.0350
Age 0.0007 0.0074 0.0018* 0.0010
Off-farm income $0–$5,000 20.0229 0.3133 20.0349 0.0323
Off-farm income$5–$50,000 0.0839 0.1858 0.0036 0.0256
Off-farm income > $50,000 20.6806* 0.3809 20.0541 0.0340
Education 20.0042 0.0468 20.0014 0.0062
Debt/asset ratio 0.0473 0.2307 0.0034 0.0324
Farm Size 20.0224 0.0140 20.0030 0.0036
Probability of APH/Corn 0.0082 0.0089 0.0016 0.0015
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debt-to-asset ratio and levels of business risk
are significant in the multivariate model ap-
proach, while they are insignificant in the in-
dividual probit model approach.
Paramater Estimates and Marginal Effects:
Multinomial Probit Model
Parameter estimates and marginal effects from
the multinomial probit model are presented in
Table 6. As mentioned above, the multinomial
probit results provide information/inference
that is different from the multivariate probit
model because it focuses on factors affecting
the combination of risk management tools that
a producer chooses. But note that most of the
significant variables found in the multivariate
probit analysis are also significant in the mul-
tinomial probit analysis, which is indicative of
the robustness of the results. For example, the
proportion of owned acres is significant for
combinations that include either crop insurance
or forward contracting (e.g., forward contract-
ing only, crop insurance and forward contract-
ing, crop insurance and spreading sales, and the
Table 6. Continued.
Combination/Independent Variables
Parameter Estimate Marginal Effect
Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error
Probability of APH/Soybeans 20.0033 0.0090 20.0003 0.0013
Illinois 0.4302 0.3029 0.0592 0.0455
Iowa 0.8265*** 0.2933 0.1217*** 0.0427
Combination 7: Forward contracting and spreading sales
Proportion of acres owned 20.0135 0.2590 0.0279 0.0254
Age 20.0267*** 0.0083 20.0018** 0.0008
Off-farm income $0–$5,000 0.4055 0.3132 0.0239 0.0353
Off-farm income$5–$50,000 -0.0091 0.2082 20.0079 0.0196
Off-farm income > $50,000 -0.2982 0.3540 20.0022 0.0327
Education 0.0255 0.0511 0.0024 0.0049
Debt/asset ratio 0.0730 0.2585 0.0053 0.0264
Farm size 0.0055 0.0072 0.0011 0.0018
Probability of APH/corn -0.0261** 0.0124 20.0028* 0.0016
Probability of APH/soybeans -0.0004 0.0126 0.0001 0.0013
Illinois 0.0919 0.2672 20.0007 0.0261
Iowa -0.1702 0.2640 20.0007 0.0301
Combination 8: Use all three risk management tools
Proportion of acres owned 20.4895** 0.2006 20.0817 0.0557
Age 20.0268*** 0.0064 20.0057*** 0.0014
Off-farm income $0–$5,000 0.6298*** 0.2382 0.1656*** 0.0623
Off-farm income$5–$50,000 0.2020 0.1574 0.0490 0.0376
Off-farm income > $50,000 20.4878* 0.2867 20.0677 0.0564
Education 0.0494 0.0395 0.0151 0.0092
Debt/asset ratio 0.1030 0.1909 0.0266 0.0476
Farm Size 0.0113** 0.0047 0.0052 0.0046
Probability of APH/corn 0.0020 0.0076 0.0011 0.0026
Probability of APH/soybeans 20.0013 0.0078 20.00001 0.0022
Illinois 0.1083 0.2141 0.0041 0.0517
Iowa 0.1497 0.2097 0.0057 0.0576
Log-likelihood value 21225.23
Notes: *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Omitted combination is the case
where no risk management tool is used.Marginal effects are calculated at the means of explanatory variables.
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that the proportion of owned acres also strongly
influences the decision to adopt crop insurance
and forward contracting in the multivariate
probit analysis above. Other observable cova-
riates in the multinomial probit specification
that substantially influence the different com-
binations of risk management tools chosen are:
farm size, age, off-farm income, education, and
perceived probability of receiving APH pay-
ment (corn). The marginal effects for these
variables (evaluated atthemean) alsotend to be
significant and have modest magnitudes (see
Table 6).
The results from the analysis of factors af-
fecting the use of all three risk management
tools (i.e., combination 8) merits further dis-
cussion here since this is the combination most
frequently adopted by the producers in our
sample (i.e., aside from the ‘‘use no risk man-
agement tool considered in this study’’ combi-
nation). The parameter estimates associated
with proportion of owned acres, age, and higher
off-farm incomes(Off-Farm Income > $50,000)
tend to reduce the probability of simulta-
neously adopting all three risk management
tools considered in this study (crop insurance,
forward contracting, and spreading sales). In
contrast, having low off-farm income (Off-
Farm Income $0–$5,000) and larger farm sizes
tend to increase the probability of using all
three risk management tools (crop insurance,
forward contracting, and spreading sales) at the
same time. The signs of these significant vari-
ables are consistent with the multivariate probit
analysis results in the previous section and
coincide with a priori expectations. Note,
however, that only Age and Off-Farm Income
$0–$5,000 have statistically significant margi-
nal effects evaluated at the means.
Concluding Comments
Farmers have a number of options in managing
agricultural risks and many of them utilize
these risk management tools simultaneously.
However, the literature on factors affecting
adoption of two or more risk management tools
has not analyzed the issue in this context. It is
often implicitly assumed that the decision to
adopt one risk management tool is independent
of the decision to adopt other risk management
tools. In this study, we specifically investigate
the factors that affect farmers’ adoption of
crop insurance, forward contracting, and spread-
ing sales, while taking into account the potential
for simultaneous adoption and/or correlation
among the adoption decisions using multivariate
probit and multinomial probit approaches.
Using a multivariate probit approach, we
find that risk management adoption decisions
are indeed correlated (even after controlling for
observable factors). Furthermore, our analysis
suggests that the decision to adopt one risk
management tool positively influences the de-
cision to adopt the other tools. These results
suggest that producers consider how the dif-
ferent risk management tools interact to affect
their net return distributions and they conse-
quently take this correlation into account in
their decision process. Given the correlation of
risk management adoption decisions, it appears
more appropriate to investigate factors that af-
fect risk management decisions in a multivari-
ate context rather than estimating each adop-
tion equation individually. Future studies need
to take the correlation among adoption deci-
sions into account to provide more accurate
parameter estimates and inferences. Although
estimated parameters are fairly similar under
the multivariate probit estimation and individ-
ual probit estimation, there are differences in
terms of the magnitude, significance levels, and
interpretation of the marginal effects calcula-
tion under both procedures.
Our empirical results from the multivari-
ate probit approach point to the importance of
the proportion of owned acres, off-farm in-
come levels, education, age, and level of
business risks as factors that determine
adoption of crop insurance, forward con-
tracting, and spreading sales. Furthermore,
we note that the conditional marginal effects
of these factors with respect to the likelihood
of adopting a particular risk management tool
tend to be lower than the marginal effects
from the individual equation-by-equation
probit model. Again, this emphasizes the
importance of accounting for potential cor-
relation among the risk management adoption
Velandia et al.: Farmers’ Utilization of Agricultural Risk Management Tools 121decisions by using a multivariate approach
because an equation-by-equation probit analysis
would not be able to capture marginal effects
that are conditional on the simultaneous adop-
tion of other risk management tools.
The multinomial probit estimation proce-
dure points to the same variables that the
multivariate probit analysis reveals as the ones
substantially influencing the risk management
tools that producers adopt (i.e., proportion of
owned acres, age, off-farm income levels, and
farm size). But the multinomial probit provides
additional information that the multivariate
probit does not provide because the former
looks at factors affecting the combination of
tools utilized by the farmers in our sample.
Hence, using both multivariate and multino-
mial probit approaches to analyze risk man-
agement choices provides richer interpreta-
tions, better inferences, and more information
that may further enhance understanding of the
risk management decisions of producers. Ex-
tension educators and other risk management
information providers may be able to tailor
their programs better, based on the information
gleaned from the multivariate and multinomial
probit procedures. For example, since older
farmers with larger farms tend to use all three
tools, risk management educators can tailor a
more comprehensive training/outreach pro-
gram for this target population that covers the
fundamentals of all three risk management
tools considered in this study. Policy makers
can also better anticipate which types of
farmers would adopt crop insurance or other
government supported risk management tools
in the presence of other risk management tools
based on the multivariate probit analysis.
[Received December 2007; Accepted June 2008.]
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